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COMMENT

When Self Abuse Becomes Child Abuse:
The Need for Coercive Prenatal

Government Action in Response to the
Cocaine Baby Problem
We are guilty of many errors and many faults
but our worst crime
is abandoning the children
neglecting the fountain of life.
Many of the things we need
can wait. The child cannot.
Right now is the time
his bones are being formed, his
blood is being made, and
his senses are being developed.
To him we cannot answer
"Tomorrow."
His name is "Today.'''
-Gabriela Mistral
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the drug awareness explosion in the 60's, our concern about
the problem of drug abuse has grown. Drug traffickers have become
more sophisticated, more dangerous, and more difficult to stop. The
profit-driven search for an expanding market has found children of
progressively younger ages open to the lure of drugs. Mothers and
fathers caught in a cycle of addiction and poverty have raised children
who in turn are raising children who will grow up in poverty and
2
addiction .
1. ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Juvenile law and Practice 12-1
(1990) (quoting Gabriela Mistral, Nobel Prize winning Chilean poet).
2. See Comment, A Proposal to Illinois Legislators: Revise the Illinois Crimto Include Criminal Sanctions Against Prenatal Substance Abusers, 23 J.
Code
inal
MARSHALL L. Rv. 393, 401-02, nn.47-53 (1990).
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The tragedy of drug-addicted women giving birth to drug-addicted babies has become the subject of much publicity and debate.'
Of particular concern is the increasing use of cocaine and its smokable
derivative "crack," which are fast becoming the drugs of choice,
especially among women.4 The most troubling aspect of women using
drugs is the alarming increase in the number of women using drugs
during pregnancy. Although specifically tailored drug treatment programs are available for pregnant women, these programs are insufficient to cope with the numbers of pregnant addicts in need of drug
6
treatment.
More tragic than the fate of these women, are the lives of the
children they bear. Unfortunately, these children have been the overlooked victims, 7 and the plight of prenatally drug-exposed children
have only recently been attracting attention. For the last 10-15 years,
various courts have been used as forums for obtaining help on behalf

3. See Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, 12 Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989,
at 1, 28; Flaherty, Cocaine Babies Cry for Help, Chicago Sun Times, May 14, 1989,
at 8, col. 2; Blakeslee, Crack's Toll Among Babies: A Joyless View of Even Toys,
NY Times, Sept. 17, 1989, at 12, col. 1; Hundley, Infants: A Growing Casualty of
the Drug Epidemic, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 2; and Born Hooked:
Confronting the Impact of Perinatal Substance Abuse, Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Family, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
[hereinafter Hearing].
4. Hearing, supra note 3, at 110 (statement by Wendy Chavkin, M.D.,
Rockefeller Fellow, Sergievsky Center, Columbia University School of Public Health,
New York, NY). See also Blakeslee, supra note 3, at 12, col. 1 ("More women than
men are now reported using crack in several major American cities .... ").
5. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Congressman George Miller,
Chairman of the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Family) (In a recent
study of 18 hospitals around the country, 15 of them have reported that the incidence
of prenatal drug abuse has either tripled or quadrupled since 1985). See also Hearing,
supra note 3, at 25 (statement of Margaret L. Gallen, CNM, MSN, District of
Columbia General Hospital, Washington, D.C.) ("This is not an epidemic it is a
pandemic.").
6. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 117 (statement by Chavkin) (Most drug
treatment programs will not accept pregnant addicts. Of those programs that will
accept pregnant women, fewer than half provide prenatal care. Even fewer offer
child care. A major obstacle for many women who need a drug treatment program
is a lack of child care for the children they already have.).
7. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 129 (statement by Dr. Haynes Rice, Director,
Howard University Hospital, Washington, D.C.) ("Daily we all see in the papers the
violent side of the drug epidemic in our streets, but few of us see the tiny victims of
this drug epidemic who did not choose to be a part of the drug culture but are held
prisoner by it.").
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of born and unborn children who have been adversely affected by
maternal drug abuse, 8 but legislatures have been slow to respond to
the problem. 9 At the end of the 1980's cocaine and crack use increased
dramatically, and suddenly maternal drug use was reported as a
national crisis in the media. I0
This comment will define the scope of the prenatal drug use
problem, discuss the possible solutions, and seek to provide some
impetus for legislation and concerted legal action designed to prevent
the continuing increase in the occurrence of drug-impaired newborns.
First, this comment will examine the harmful effects prenatal drug
use has on children, their mothers, and society, and the possible
solutions available through the legal system. Second, this comment
will present an overview of past judicial decisions responding to the
problem prior to specific legislation and will document the minimal
legislation that is currently in effect. Finally, this comment will discuss
the effectiveness and constitutionality of the possible responses, with
a focus on the more radical legislation adopted by Illinois and
Minnesota.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE

In the spring of 1989, the House Select Committee on Children,
Youth, and Families met to release the results of a nationwide study
and discuss the problem of prenatal drug exposure." The study was
prompted by a combination of experts' warnings and the rather
sudden and dramatic outbreak of crack usage.' 2 At the Hearing, it
was disclosed that an estimated 1107 of pregnant women in 1988 used
drugs during their pregnancies. 3 It was also estimated that as many
as 375,000 newborn infants were prenatally exposed to the damaging
effects of drugs in that same year. ' 4 Furthermore, every indication
shows that the problem is getting markedly worse. 5
8. See infra notes 64-112 and accompanying text for a chronicle of the Courts'
involvement with prenatally drug exposed babies.
9. See infra notes 116-152 and accompanying text for a list and explanation
of state statutes that do respond to the problem.
10. See supra note 3 for a list of some articles reporting on the cocaine baby

problem.

11. Hearing, supra note 3.
12. Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement by Miller).
13. Hearing, supra note 3, at 1. Cf. Sherman, supra note 3 (reporting an
estimate that 15% of pregnant women use drugs); Hundley, supra note 3, at 1, col.
2 (referring to a National Institute of Drug Abuse estimate that 10% of pregnant

women are using cocaine alone).

14. Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement by Miller).
15. Supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also Hearing, supra note 3, at 7
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A. THE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON CHILDREN, THEIR MOTHERS, AND
SOCIETY.

While the dramatic increase in the popularity of cocaine and
crack has spurred a renewed concern about drugs in general, 6 there
is cause for greater concern about the increase of cocaine and crack
use in particular. Unlike problem drugs of the past such as heroin,
the use of cocaine among women is widespread, 7 and crack use is
presently increasing with alarming speed.' 8 Cocaine and crack are also
particularly addictive,19 and continued use of these drugs may quickly
become a driving obsession. 20 These drugs also have peculiarly insid15. Supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also Hearing, supra note 3, at 7
(survey by the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families), 46 (statement
by Neal Halfon, M.D., M.P.H., Director, Center for the Vulnerable Child, Oakland's
Children's Hospital and Assistant Clinical Professor of Pediatrics and Health Policy,
Department of Pediatrics and Institute for Policy Studies, University of California,
San Francisco, CA) & 50 (prepared summary by Halfon). See also Hundley, supra
note 3, at 1 (A 1989 study at Detroit's Hutzel Hospital revealed that 42.7% of the
newborns there were exposed to drugs in utero. The officials who conducted the
study had estimated the figure to be closer to 20%. The article cites Raj Wiener,
Director of the Michigan Department of Public Health who admitted that the results
reveal "a much more serious problem than we had imagined.").
16. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (statement by Miller).
17. Flaherty, supra note 3, at 8, col. 2 (as reported in an interview with Dr.
Ira Chasnoff, Director of the Perinatal Center for Addiction Research at Northwestern Memorial Hospital).
18. Hearing, supra note 3, at 1 (opening statement by Chairman Miller) ("the
epidemic of 'crack' has exploded onto the American landscape"). See also supra note
4 and accompanying text.
19. See MacGregor, Keith, Chasnoff, Rosner, Chisum, Shaw, & Minogue,
Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Adverse Perinatal Outcome, presentation at the
Seventh Annual Meeting of the Society of Perinatal Obstetricians (Feb. 5-7, 1987)
reprinted in 157 AM. J. OBS. GYN. 686 (1987) [hereinafter Adverse PerinatalOutcome]
("[N]o medically ... accepted definitions exist by which the terms 'use' and 'abuse'
may be differentiated. However, the highly addictive nature of cocaine suggests that
they may be used interchangeably."). See also Hearing, supra note 3, at 23 (statement
by Margaret L. Gallen, C.N.M., M.S.N.) (crack is a highly concentrated form of
cocaine; addiction to the user is "almost a certainty.").
20. Margaret L. Gallen, a registered nurse at District of Columbia General
Hospital in Washington, D.C., made the following personal observations over a four
month period in 1989 at District of Columbia General Hospital: a thirteen year old
pregnant girl was arrested for transporting "crack" over state lines and brought to
the hospital for treatment. A twenty-eight year old mother was brought to the hospital
by ambulance with a four pound eight ounce dead male newborn and placenta,
"claiming she had last free based cocaine three days prior to delivery." A thirtyeight year old pregnant woman was brought to the hospital by ambulance "having
seizures, semi-comatose but still clinging to a piece of 'crack'." This mother had
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ious psychological effects. 2' Furthermore, researchers are beginning
to find that children exposed to cocaine and crack suffer substantial
22
immediate and long-term harmful effects.
The fetus experiences the same immediate physical effects of the
drugs as the mother, 23 but to a greater degree. The placenta actually
absorbs the drug from the mother's body like a sponge. 24 While
cocaine passes through an adult's body in approximately 24 hours, it

been continuously using crack for the preceding twenty-four hours. She gave birth
to a live infant before the mother died. One young woman related how a neighbor
sold her baby "just to get enough money to satisfy her compulsion." See Hearing,
supra note 3, at 21 and 22 (statement by Gallen).
21. Comment, supra note 2, at 398 ("Cocaine has a unique ability to undermine
the maternal instinct causing the mother to be completely oblivious to her fetus/
newborn.") (citing Regan, Ehrlich, & Finnegan, Infants of Drug Addicts: At Risk
for Child Abuse, Neglect, and Placement in Foster Care, 9 NEUROTOXICOLGY AND
TERATOLOOY 315 (1987) and Trost, Born to Lose: Babies of Crack Users Crowd
Hospitals, Break Everybody's Heart, WALL ST.J., July 18, 1989, at Al, A6 (Midwest
ed.)). One mother is even reported to have sold her child for more drugs. Hearing,
supra note 3, at 22 (statement by Margaret Gallen).
Researchers have commented that cocaine and crack seem to "[interfere] with
the central core of what it is to be human." Blakeslee, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2,
(quoting Coryl Jones, a research psychologist at the National Institute of Drug Abuse
in Bethesda, Md.) (Cocaine-exposed children exhibit considerable emotional and
learning impairment. They have difficulty playing without guidance. They have
unpredictable mood swings. They do not easily bond with other people.). See also
Chasnoff, Perinatal Effects of Cocaine, CONTEMPORARY OB.GYN. 163, 176 (May
1987) [hereinafter PerinatalEffects] (Cocaine-exposed infants do not bond easily with
their caretakers.).
22. Chasnoff, Griffith, MacGregor, Dirkes, & Burns, Temporal Patterns of
Cocaine Use in Pregnancy [hereinafter Patterns], 261 J.A.M.A. 1741 (1989).
23. A pregnant woman's system is already overloaded. "Her metabolism
increases considerably because she really is breathing for two, eating for two, voiding
for two etc. [sic]" When a pregnant woman uses crack, all her blood vessels constrict
within a matter of seconds; her blood pressure shoots up; and her heart beats so fast
that "she will tell you that it feels like it's about to jump out of her chest." The
rapid rise in blood pressure and constriction of blood vessels puts her at a great risk
that the placenta will dislodge from the wall of the uterus. Hearing, supra note 3, at
24 (statement of Margaret L. Gallen, CNM, MSN, District of Columbia General
Hospital). See also Buchanan, Cocaine Intoxication: A Review of the Presentation
and Treatment of Medical Complications,HosPrrAL PHYSIcIAN, March, 1988, 24, 2528 (Large doses or continuous usage may lead to anxiety, agitation, paranoia, seizures,
and may even produce coma. Cocaine or crack use also leads to respiratory depression
and arrest and permanent pulmonary injury, brain hemorrhaging, hypothermia,
abdominal pain, diarrhea, and even intestinal gangrene.).
24. Blakeslee, supra note 3, col. 1. See also Chasnoff, PerinatalEffects, supra
note 21, at 171.
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may take four to six days to pass through the unborn child's system. 25
The immediate physical effects of drug exposure on the fetus include
retarded growth, abnormal development, miscarriages, abruption of
the placenta, premature delivery, and strokes.26
The effects of prenatal drug exposure may also be immediately
noticeable at birth. Prenatally drug-exposed newborns typically are
shorter, have lower birth weights, and have smaller head circumferences than other infants. 27 Some newborns also suffer severe withdrawal symptoms including restlessness, poor feeding, high-pitched
crying, sweating, tremulousness, vomiting, diarrhea, hypertonicity, 2
fever, and convulsions. 29 They also suffer from respiratory irregularities and an increased incidence of Sudden Infant Death syndrome. 0
In addition, these infants are unable to respond to and interact with
their environment;3 ' they cannot tolerate multiple stimuli, are easily
2
agitated, and respond poorly to attempts at comforting.
Perhaps most significantly, prenatal exposure to cocaine or crack
may have long term adverse consequences." Unlike children who were
prenatally exposed to other drugs such as PCP and heroin, early
indications are that children exposed to cocaine and crack may never
reach normal development.3 4 Although research is limited, it indicates
25. Perinatal Effects, supra note 21, at 175. See also Hearing, supra note 3, at
24 (statement of Gallen) (The cocaine or crack is filtered out of the body through
the kidneys. However, a pregnant woman's kidneys are already overloaded. Consequently, the drug stays in her system longer than it would if she were not pregnant.
Furthermore, the baby's body flushes the cocaine or "crack" through its kidneys
and into the amniotic fluid. Therefore, "[h]e now takes his own supply of cocaine
by mouth ... and his supply will last for days, until it is filtered out of his amniotic
fluid.").
26. Hearing, supra note 3, at 47, 58 (statement of Neal Halfon, M.D., M.P.H.,
Director of the Center for the Vulnerable Child at Children's Hospital in Oakland,
California).
27. Perinatal Effects, supra note 21, at 176.
28. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 942 (2d ed.
1987) ("increased rigidity, tension, and spasticity of the muscles").
29. Chasnoff, Newborn Infants with Drug WithdrawalSymptoms, 9 PEDIATRICS
IN REvIEw 273, 274 (March 1988).
30. PerinatalEffects, supra note 21, at 176 (One study showed that the rate of
SIDS in cocaine-exposed babies more than tripled that of heroin- or methadoneexposed babies.).
31. Patterns, supra note 22, at 1741, 1743. See also Blakeslee, supra note 3, at
12, col. 1 (as reported from a conversation with Dr. Chasnoff).
32. Perinatal Effects, supra note 21, at 176. See also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
33. Patterns, supra note 22, at 1744.
34. See Blakeslee, supra note 3, at 12, col. 2 (reported from an interview with
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that the emotional and behavioral effects of prenatal exposure to
cocaine and crack may last indefinitely." One study shows that, when
these babies become toddlers, they score low on intelligence tests and

even lower on their ability to concentrate, interact, and play by
themselves. 3 6 At the age of one year the prognosis is slightly better,
but these children continue to show symptoms of mild autism 3 7 or
personality disorders.3
The burden on society to care for these children is a heavy one.
The experts predict these children will overwhelm hospitals, child
protective services, foster care systems, schools, future employers,
and society in general.3 9 The intensive and extensive care required by
drug-exposed babies is already having a dramatic impact on hospital
space in some areas. 4° Not only do these children require a tremendous
Dr. Judith Howard, director of the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect Team at
U.C.L.A.).
35. See generally Blakeslee, supra note 3, at 12, cols. 2, 3 (repoiting on an
eleven year study conducted by Dr. Judith Howard, director of the Suspected Child
Abuse and Neglect Team at U.C.L.A.).
36. Blakeslee, supra note 3, at 12, col. 1, 2. (reported in an interview with Dr.
Ira Chasnoff, director of the Perinatal Center for Chemical Dependency at Northwestern University School of Medicine in Chicago).
37. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 139 (2d ed.

1987) ("a pervasive developmental disorder of children, characterized by impaired
communication, excessive rigidity, and emotional detachment").
38. Blakeslee, supra note 3, at 12, col. 3 ("[these conditions are] characterized
by withdrawal and lack of emotion").
39. See Blakeslee, supra note 3, at 12, col. 1. See also Hearing, supra note 3,
at 2 (opening statement of Chairman Miller) ("[These children have the ability to
swamp every system involved with their care, from hospitals to child protective
services to foster care to schools." Miller also noted that in his suburban California
district prenatally drug-exposed babies make up 60-75% of the foster care caseloads
in the county.). One doctor in California has reported that as many as 60% of drug
exposed infants are placed in foster care and are "flooding" the foster care system
in his area. Hearing, supra note 3, at 47 (Statement by Dr. Neal Halfron).
40. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 3, at 124-128 (statement by Dr. Haynes Rice,
Director of Howard University Hospital, Washington, D.C.) (While the normal
expected length of stay for a newborn is three days, for a five month period at
Howard University Hospital in Washington, D.C., the actual average length of stay
was over twelve days. Many newborns are actually abandoned by their addicted
mothers. These factors have caused a space shortage which has become particularly
acute at some hospitals. For example, the occupancy rate for the last five months of
1988 at Howard University Hospital was 12001o. "The worst we have seen it was
when we were unable to identify an empty NICU bed between Philadelphia and
Richmond." The resulting overcrowding threatens to prevent access to services for
other women and their children.) See also Hundley, supra note 3, at 9 (Nurses at
Detroit's Hutzel Hospital report that it is not unusual to see drug dependent teenaged
mothers give birth and walk out of the hospital without coming back.)
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commitment of human resources, they will also present an enormous
drain on public finances. 41 The cost of providing the specialized care
and individual attention required to integrate these children into
society will be great. 42 However, the failure to pay the price now may
lead to greater costs in the future. If the effort is not made to help
these children overcome the impairment of prenatal drug exposure
when they are young, they will likely become candidates for criminal
43
or mental institutions as adults.
B.

POSSIBLE LEGAL SOLUTIONS

Yet, efforts focusing only on problems that arise after birth
appear inadequate to prevent the increase in prenatal drug exposure.
The so-called "cocaine baby" problem may be broken down into
three stages: 1) preconception, 2) prenatal, and 3) postnatal. The
ultimate response must include prevention at the preconception stage
where the problem of drug use begins." Efforts at this stage, should
include attempts to eliminate contributing societal factors, 45 education

41. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 3, at 127 (statement of Haynes Rice) (As
noted in the five month study at Howard University Hospital, one child had been in
the hospital for 245 days at a cost of over $250,000. Yet, the hospital only receives
a maximum of $6100 from Medicaid upon the discharge of such a patient.) See also
Hundley, supra note 3, at 9 (At Hutzel Hospital in Detroit, 50-60% of the neonatal
intensive-care patients are prenatally drug-exposed infants. The typical intensive-care
costs at Hutzel Hospital are between $7500 and $31,000, though they may go as high
as $150,000.).
The cost of long-term care is even greater. One model program in Los Angeles
illustrates the enormity of the task involved in providing the kind of comprehensive
care that is needed. The program was designed for preschool children prenatally
exposed to drugs and utilizes three adult teachers per classroom of eight children. In
addition, the support services of a psychologist, social worker, nurse, pediatrician,
adaptive physical educator and a speech and language therapist are used in the
attempt to ready the children for school and later life. One need not be a mathematician to realize the tremendous cost of and resources needed to provide such a
comprehensive program. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 203-210 (statement of Carol
Cole, M.A., Child Development Specialist/Teacher, Salvin Special Education Center,
Los Angeles Unified School District).
42. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 203-210 (statement by Cole).
43. See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 8, cols. 2, 3 (as noted in an interview with
Department of Child and Family Services worker, Gordon Johnson).
44. See generally Hearing, supra note 3 (discussing methods of prevention).
45. See Hulbert, Saving America's Babies, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 1989,
at 19 (contributing societal factors include poverty, poor education, minority and
single-parent status, and youth).
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programs, 46 drug treatment programs, 47 and greater accountability for
drug users. 4
The impact of the problem is not immediately felt until the postnatal stage. At this stage, the problem is manifest, and the damage is
done. It is the post-natal stage that captures our attention. We see
pictures and read stories of inconsolable babies wailing and writhing
through the pain of withdrawal. 49 Many have been abandoned by
their mothers 0 Hospitals have become overcrowded." Foster care
systems are becoming overburdened. 2 The magnitude of the problem
at this stage, in terms of sheer numbers and the devotion of time,
money, and effort required to meet the physical, emotional, and social
needs of these children could easily become the sole or primary focus
of our national and local efforts. Yet, legal solutions at this stage are
limited. The possibilities include criminal sanctions against the mother53
and termination of her parental rights.5 4 These measures, applied after
birth, may prevent future harm caused by bad parenting, but they are
too late to prevent the harm to the child that has already occurred.
Although these measures may have some deterrent effect," many
56
women will not be deterred.
The prenatal stage is the most critical for purposes of prevention.
Education and persuasion, combined with the impetus of pregnancy,
may convince many pregnant drug users to stop using drugs or seek

46. See generally Hearing, supra note 3.
47. See generally Hearing, supra note 3.
48. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 138-39 (statement by Jeffrey Parness,
Professor of Law at Northern Illinois University College of Law) (teaching and
requiring accountability through criminal laws); see also Hulbert, supra note 45, at
21; infra note 229 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 3 for a list of journalistic accounts of the condition of
babies suffering the effects of prenatal drug exposure.
50. See supra note 40; infra notes 198-99; and Comment, supra note 2, at 39899 & n.33.
51. See supra notes 40 and 41 for accounts of overcrowding.
52. See supra note 39 noting the effect on foster systems in California.
53. Infra notes 111-12 (making prenatal drug use a factor to be considered in
sentencing for unrelated crimes) and 210-12 (suggesting application of criminal laws
to coerce prenatal care and drug treatment during pregnancy).
54. Infra notes 64-94 (citing past judicial decisions) and 133-78 (citing present
legislation).
55. See infra note 209 and accompanying text (criminal laws) and page 37
(child abuse and neglect laws).
56. See page 36 (criminal laws) and infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text
(child abuse and neglect laws).
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help. 7 However, time is not on the side of the developing fetus;
efforts to prevent prenatal drug exposure must work immediately or
fail. If the pregnant drug user is not persuaded and fails or refuses
to stop or get help, more drastic measures may be the only effective
preventative solution. At this point, reliance on the legal system may
be the only effective and appropriate response.19 These legal solutions
may include involuntary confinement and/or compelled treatment.60
III.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM

Various sectors of society have cried for more affirmative governmental action on behalf of children victimized by prenatal exposure
to illicit drugs. 61 State and federal legislators have been slow to
respond. 62 However, for the last ten to fifteen years, courts have
increasingly been confronted with many child abuse and criminal cases
involving pregnant drug users and their children, both born and
unborn. 63 These courts have had little or no legislative guidance upon
which to rely.
A.

CIVIL COURT CASES

In some instances, courts have waded into murky constitutional
waters. A pair of New York cases illustrate the spectrum of concerns
which arise when courts are confronted with the competing interests
57. Of course, this assumes that drug treatment programs and facilities are
available and accessible to pregnant drug users. A major obstacle to effective
prevention of prenatal drug exposure is a lack of drug treatment programs and
facilities for pregnant drug users. See supra note 6.
58. See infra notes 207-237 and accompanying text for a discussion of measures
that may be utilized.
59. Effective solutions must also pass constitutional muster, or they are not
appropriate. See infra notes 238-316 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
constitutionality of the extraordinary measures proposed.
60. See, e.g., infra notes 166-178 and accompanying text (explaining the
Minnesota civil commitment scheme) and infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text
(pursuant to criminal laws).
61. See generally Sherman, supra note 3, at 28.

62. See infra note 134 and accompanying text for a list of states' statutes
specifically addressing the cocaine baby problem and in effect at the time of this
writing.
63. See, e.g., In re Vanessa F, 76 Misc. 2d 617, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sur. Ct.
1974) (custody action involving a child born with fetal drug-dependency); In re
Dittrick, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (Ct. App. 1977) (custody action
involving an unborn child whose mother was an addict); and Sherman, supra note
2, at 1 (reporting on numerous attempts to prosecute pregnant addicts).
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involved in dealing with the sensitive subject of pregnancy. The first
case, In re Smith, 64 involved the issue of whether an unborn child can
be afforded the protection of the state's child abuse laws. 65 The
relevant statute defined a child as one "less than eighteen years of
age." 66 The statute was silent as to unborn children. Nevertheless, the
court held that extending the protection to the unborn followed from
the purpose of the statute. 67 In reaching its conclusion that an unborn
child may be deemed neglected, the court pointed to language in Roe
v. Wade" which recognized the states' "important and legitimate
interest in [sic] protecting the potentiality of human life .. . "69 From
this language, the court reasoned that an interest in the "potentiality"
of life should extend to the quality of life as well. 70 By extending the
child neglect provisions to cover unborn children, the court acted to
protect the interest in the quality of fetal life.
The second New York case, In re Fletcher,71 focused on the
privacy rights of pregnant women. 72 In this case, a different New
York family court refused to recognize that a child may be deemed
neglected while in utero. 73 The court ruled that the statute's silence
74
indicated the legislature did not intend it to apply to the unborn.
The court characterized such an application as government regulation
of women's bodies in violation of their constitutional right to bodily

64. 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Far. Ct. 1985).
65. In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Farn. Ct. 1985) (The
child was born with fetal alcohol syndrome, but did not fit the definition of a
neglected child at birth. Consequently, the state sought a determination that the child

was neglected in the womb on the basis of the mother's alcohol consumption.).
66. N.Y. Family Court Act. § 1012(e) & (f) (McKinney 1983).
67. In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d at 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 335 (concluding that
states are not precluded from granting legal recognition to fetuses in non-fourteenth
amendment circumstances).
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Fam. Ct. 1985)

(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
70. In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d at 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334 (citing with approval
Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L.
REv. 1, 19 (1984)).

71. 141 Misc. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Fam. Ct. 1988).
72. In re Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Fam. Ct. 1988) (the
mother's child had tested positive for drugs although there was no evidence of
withdrawal symptoms or that the mother was a regular user).
73. In re Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d at 337, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (though evidence
of prenatal drug exposure may be a proper consideration concerning neglect after
birth, along with other factors).
74. Id.
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integrity. 75 The court in Fletcher feared that an extension of the child
neglect statute to include prenatal maternal conduct would open a
Pandora's box of government intrusions into the lives of pregnant
76
women.
These two cases, which arose in different jurisdictions and before
different judges, 7 illustrate the ambivalence that is felt when the
desire to protect prenatally drug-exposed children seems to conflict
with the privacy rights of their mothers. 78 That ambivalence is further
demonstrated by two subsequent decisions out of the same jurisdiction, one of which was authored by the judge who decided Fletcher.
The same judge who refused to terminate a mother's parental rights

on the basis of prenatal drug use in Fletcher terminated a mother's

parental rights under the 'same statute, in part, on the basis of her
prenatal misuse of alcohol in In re Milland.79 Another judge in the

same jurisdiction noted the apparent change of heart by the Fletcher
judge and, in In re Stefanel Tyesha, 80 expressly disagreed with the
decision in Fletcher.81 Contrary to the Fletcher court, the court in

75. Id.
76. Id. (including smoking cigarettes, eating junk food, doing too much physical
labor, not exercising enough).
77. Compare In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Fain. Ct. 1985)
(Judge Cornelius presiding in Family court, Monroe County) with In re Fletcher, 141
Misc. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Fain. Ct. 1988) (Judge Gallet presiding in Family
Court, Bronx County).
78. Both judges expressed concern for the plight of the children involved, but
one judge was reluctant to terminate the mother's parental rights solely on the basis
of her prenatal drug use for fear that such a ruling may open the door for future
erosion of the privacy rights of pregnant women. Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d at 337, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 243.
79. 146 Misc. 2d 1, 7, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995, 998-99 (Fam. Ct. 1989) (reasserting
that a woman cannot be charged with neglect for her prenatal conduct; therefore,
prenatal drug use, alone, is an insufficient basis upon which to terminate a woman's
parental rights).
80. 157 A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Div. 1990).
81. In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322, 327-29, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280, 28485 (App. Div. 1990). Accord, In re Stephen W., 221 Cal. App. 3d 629, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 319 (1990); and In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869
(1990).
The court in Tyesha C. asserted that "every human being has the legal right 'to
begin life unimpaired by physical or mental defects resulting from the negligence of
another."' Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d at 329, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 284 (citing Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1969)). The court also
concluded that the protection being afforded does not accrue to the benefit of unborn
children but to born children who have suffered the effects of prenatal drug exposure.
Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d at 329, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 285. However, a subsequent decision,
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Tyesha C. held that the mother's privacy right in procreation is not
implicated: "We are concerned here not with a woman's privacy right
in electing to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, but with the protection of the child who is born when a woman has elected to carry that
child to term and deliver it. '"82
The courts of other states have been faced with similar cases. In
1980, a Michigan court of appeals upheld a probate court's assertion
of child neglect jurisdiction over a newborn infant which began
exhibiting withdrawal symptoms 24 hours after birth."3 The appellate
court, in In re Baby X,14 reasoned by analogy that "[s]ince prior
treatment of one child can support neglect allegations regarding
another child, . . . prenatal treatment can be probative of a child's
neglect as well."" The relevant Michigan child neglect statute did not
expressly apply to prenatal conduct.8 6 Therefore, the court justified
its finding of neglect jurisdiction based upon the mother's prenatal
drug abuse by chronicling the state's recent recognition of fetal rights
7
in other non-abortion contexts.1

In a similar case, In re Ruiz,u an Ohio appellate court went even
further when it upheld a lower court's determination that child abuse
In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 147 Misc. 2d 551, 554, 558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (1990),
reflects the view that the state's child abuse and neglect laws actually do apply
directly to the unborn: "Interpreting our child abuse and neglect statutes to include
the unborn would be consistent with medical and scientific advances to treat the fetus
while still in the mother's womb."
82. In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d at 330, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284
(concluding that "the prenatal use of dangerous drugs by a mother is probative of
future child neglect" and may form the basis, in itself, for the termination of the
mother's parental rights).
83. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980). But cf. State
ex rel Juvenile Dept. of Marion County v. Randall, 96 Or. App. 673, 773 P.2d 1348
(1989) (indicating that, while a mother's prenatal drug use and the child's consequent
drug exposure are proper considerations, they are not sufficient, without more, to
sustain a finding of neglect).
84. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
85. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. at 116, 293 N.W.2d at 739. (In Michigan, a
prima facie case of neglect concerning one child may be made out by proof of neglect
concerning another child. This may be so even absent evidence of neglect toward the
child in question. In a similar manner, the court reasoned that the mother's prenatal
conduct effecting the fetus is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of neglect of
the child. In this way, the court did not have to decide whether a fetus may be
deemed neglected in the womb.).
86. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.2(b)(l) (West 1989 & Supp. 1990).
87. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 115, 293 N.W.2d 736, 738-39 (1980)
(including wrongful death, prenatal tort, and dramshop actions).
88. 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (C.P. 1986) (involving a baby
prenatally exposed to heroin and cocaine).
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allegations may be established solely upon the mother's prenatal
conduct.8 9 Most significantly, the court proclaimed a viable unborn
fetus to be a child for purposes of the Ohio child abuse statuteP ° The
court supported its conclusion, as did the Michigan court, by relying
upon the recent legal trend of recognizing fetal interests in other nonabortion contexts. 9' The court found further support from the recognition in Roe v. Wade92 that a state's interest in the potentiality of
fetal life becomes compelling at viability. 93
While courts have been willing to apply child abuse and neglect
statutes to children after birth based upon prenatal maternal conduct
without express statutory authorization,9 4 they have not been willing
to extend that protection to unborn children. For example, in Cox v.
Court of Common Pleas,95 another Ohio court of appeals refused to
extend the logic of Ruiz to uphold a finding of maternal abuse of a
fetus.9 In striking down the lower court's opinion, the appellate court
held that a juvenile court may not assert jurisdiction over a woman's
body on behalf of her fetus when the relevant statute does not
explicitly confer the requisite authority. 97 Similarly, a Michigan appellate court refused to allow a probate court to take jurisdiction over
a fetus whose mother had been using drugs. 98 This court declined to
recognize the probate court's assertion of jurisdiction in the absence
of an explicit legislative grant of authority, in spite of the fact that
such a grant of authority would be "desirable" in cases of maternal
prenatal drug abuse.9
In the past, as these cases demonstrate, courts have had to chart
their own courses to afford protection to prenatally drug-exposed
children.' °° Understandably, courts are hesitant to stretch statutes in
ways that legislatures probably did not intend. Their hesitancy is
89. In Re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 35, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (C.P. 1986).
90. Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d at 34, 500 N.E.2d at 938.
91. Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d at 32-34, 500 N.E.2d at 936-38 (including wrongful
death, prenatal tort, property, and paternity actions).
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 34, 500 N.E.2d 935, 938 (C.P. 1986)
(construing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 163 (1973)).
94. See supra notes 64-70 and 79-93 and accompanying text.
95. 42 Ohio App. 3d 171, 537 N.E.2d 721 (1988).

96. Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 42 Ohio App. 3d 171, 174-75, 537 N.E.2d
721, 725 (1988). But cf In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).
97.
98.
99.
100.

Cox, 42 Ohio App. 3d at 174-75, 537 N.E.2d at 725.
In re Dittrick, 80 Mich. App. 219, 222, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1977).
Dittrick, 80 Mich. App. at 223, 263 N.W.2d at 39.
See supra notes 63-99 and accompanying text.
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fueled by an ambivalence created by a child's needs and a mother's
rights.' 0 1 As a result, some courts have been willing to assert jurisdiction over prenatally drug-exposed newborns on the basis of the harm
that has already occurred, but no courts have been willing to assert
jurisdiction over fetuses of pregnant women to prevent the harm from
occurring.' ° Yet, those courts that have refused to assert jurisdiction
over a fetus or a pregnant woman have expressed the opinion that
legislation granting the requisite authority would be legitimate'0 3 and
even "desirable.' '14
Courts and prosecutors have faced similar difficulties in the

criminal arena. 05 For example, in 1989, an Illinois prosecutor charged
a 24 year old woman with involuntary manslaughter and delivery of
a controlled substance to a minor after she gave birth to a cocaine-

addicted baby who died after the birth as a result of the drug

exposure.' °6 However, the grand jury refused to proceed with an
indictment.' °7 In a more successful prosecution, a court convicted a
Florida woman of delivering controlled substances to a minor when,
in the process of giving birth, cocaine passed to her newborn child
through the uncut umbilical cord. 08 She received a sentence of one
year in a rehabilitation program and 14 years probation.' °9 The
101. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text. The treatment is anomalous:
the child's and the state's interest are only protected after birth, by which time the
damage has already been done.
103. See Cox v. Court of'Common Pleas, 42 Ohio App. 3d 171, 175, 537
N.E.2d 721, 725 (1988) ("The General Assembly may choose to address this type of
situation and design effective statutory authority, but until such time as it confers
such jurisdiction upon the respondent court, it [the juvenile court] has no power,
right, or jurisdiction to act in this manner.").
104. In re Dittrick, 80 Mich. App. 219, 223, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1977). ("The
Legislature may wish to consider appropriate amendments to the Probate Code.
Indeed, the background of the present case has convinced us that such amendments
would be desirable. However, . . . [w]e decline by judicial amendment to do that
which, at the time of enactment, the Legislature did not contemplate.").
105. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 3, at 1 (indicating that at least ten women
in 1989 faced criminal charges in California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and
South Carolina relating to their cocaine, heroin or alcohol use during pregnancy).
106. Marcotte, Crime and Pregnancy, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 14.
107. Lamb, Grand Jury Refuses to Indict Mom, Rockford Register Star, May
27, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
108. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 28 (citing State v. Johnson, no. 89-890CFA
(Cir. Ct., Seminole County)).
109. See Sherman, supra note 3,at 28. As a condition of probation, she must
report any future pregnancies to law enforcement authorities; if she becomes pregnant
during the probation period, she is to be subject to court-approved prenatal care and
treatment. Sherman, supra note 3, at 1.
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legislators who passed the law probably never envisioned that it would
be applied to a mother giving birth to a prenatally drug-exposed
infant," 0 but the court was evidently willing to take that risk.
The only successful prebirth actions on behalf of unborn children
whose mothers are drug users have come in the criminal area. For
example, one pregnant addict, who was convicted of forging checks,
was given the extraordinary punishment of a prison sentence even
though it was her first offense."' The judge admittedly sentenced the
woman to jail in order to protect the developing fetus from the
2
mother's cocaine addiction."
However, instances where courts have utilized the criminal laws
to protect drug-exposed fetuses or prenatally drug-exposed infants are
rare because legislation applying criminal laws to drug use during
pregnancy is non-existent. To date, no states have passed legislation
making prenatal drug use a crime, in itself, separate from the general
prohibition against drug use; and no states have passed legislation
making prenatal drug use a factor to be considered in sentencing.
Consequently, our society presently does not hold women criminally
accountable for harming their children through the prenatal use of
drugs. Any application of present laws to produce that effect, is solely
the product of judicial ingenuity and the willingness to accept bold
interpretations of the law - a practice which, many would certainly
agree, is not ultimately desirable.
V.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

While prenatal drug use has been increasing," 3 societal costs have
been mounting 1 4 and many courts have been confronted with the
problem of infant prenatal drug exposure," 5 very few legislatures have
responded to the problem. Only a few states have passed legislation
which targets prenatal drug use or which expressly extends protection
to the unborn." 6 Even this legislation is inadequate. Statutes that
110. Arguably, the legislature would have explicitly included prenatally drugexposed infants in the statute if they had meant for it to apply to them.
111. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 1.
112. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 1.
113. Supra note 5.
114. Supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
115. Supra notes 63-112 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 120, 133, and 134 and accompanying text. The statutes
addressed in this comment are the statutes in effect when the comment was written.
Subsequent to the writing of this comment, but before publication, legislation may
have been passed in other states.
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expressly offer general protection to the unborn have not proven

useful to the courts."! At least one statute that applies to parental
drug use does not expressly apply to prenatal drug use;'" 8 and most
of the statutes that do apply to prenatal drug use do not afford
adequate protection.' 1 9
A.

STATUTES WHICH EXPRESSLY APPLY TO THE UNBORN

At least two states, New Jersey and California, have statutes
which apply specifically to the unborn.1' 2 The New Jersey statute

provides that, whenever the welfare of a child is in danger, the Bureau
of Children's Services may intervene. 121 The statute expressly applies
to unborn children as well as born children. 22 In spite of the inclusive
language that would seem to cover prenatal drug exposure, no reported cases have applied the statute in that way. Evidently, the New
Jersey courts have not been willing to apply a general child abuse and

neglect statute to prenatal drug use.

California also has a child neglect statute which expressly applies

to the unborn,2 3 but that statute has been held to be inapplicable to
maternal prenatal drug use.' 24 The statute was originally intended to
117. See infra notes 120-128 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutes
which generally apply to unborn children but which were not intended specifically to
apply to prenatal drug exposure.
118. See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 133-152 and accompanying text.
120. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270
(West 1988).
121. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981) reads in relevant part:
Whenever it shall appear that any child within this State is of such circumstances
that his welfare will be endangered unless proper care or custody is provided, an
application setting forth the facts in the case may be filed with the Bureau of
Childrens Services ... seeking that the Bureau ... accept and provide such care or
custody ....
The provisions of this section shall be deemed to include an application
on behalf of an unborn child ....
Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) states in relevant part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to
furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other
remedial care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor
A child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing
person insofar as this section is concerned.
124. See Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the
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criminalize a father's willful failure to support his children.' 2 5 It was
subsequently amended to include application to the unborn for the
purpose of forcing men to support women they impregnate. 126 The
statute was amended again in 1974 to make it gender neutral on
grounds that women are as responsible as men for the financial
support of their children. 127 Noting the legislative history, the court
concluded the statute was never intended to apply to prenatal drug
use. 12 Consequently, although both the New Jersey and California
statutes expressly apply to unborn children, neither statute has been
used to address the problem of prenatal drug abuse.
B.

STATUTES WHICH APPLY SPECIFICALLY TO PARENTAL DRUG USE

Other states have passed child abuse and neglect legislation more
specifically tailored to the problem of parental drug use. However,
not all of these statutes were designed to apply to prenatal drug use.
For example, a long-standing New York provision of the New York
Family Court Act provides that parental drug use is probative of
neglect but makes no mention of prenatal drug use. 129 Hence, any
application to prenatal drug use is a species of judicial construction.' 30

Criminalization of "'FetalAbuse," 101 HARv. L. REv. 994 n.4 (1988) (referring to

the Pamela Rae Stewart case as reported in N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1987, at 82, col.
1, in which a woman was tried under CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 for refusing medical
treatment and continuing to use illicit drugs during pregnancy which resulted in the
death of her child after birth).
125. See id.at 994 n.l.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. While noting that the legislature did not intend § 270 to apply to
prenatal drug use, the judge appealed to the California legislature to enact appropriate
laws for that purpose. Id.
129. N.Y. FAMImY COURT ACT § 1012(f) (McKinney 1983). The statute defines a
neglected child, inter alia, as one
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is
in imminent danger of impairment as a result of the failure of his parent
...to exercise a minimum degree of care ....
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship...
by misusing a drug or drugs ....

130. Id. (practice commentary). The practice commentary indicates that prenatal
drug use, by itself, does not ordinarily establish neglect. Further proof is required
that such drug use has caused the child's condition to be "impaired or in imminent
danger of becoming impaired" unless the parent presently evidences the "specified
degree of addiction" required by § 1046(a)(iii) of the Family Court Act. In which
case, such drug use is deemed prima facie evidence of neglect. Sec. 1046(a)(iii)
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The courts have construed the statute to allow post birth withdrawal
symptoms to establish prima facie evidence of neglect.' 31 However,
the courts are divided as to whether impairment at birth due to
prenatal conduct is sufficient, by itself, to support a subsequent
132
finding of neglect.
At least seven states have recently passed laws of varying complexity which are expressly designed to address the cocaine baby
problem.' All of these laws involve changes to the respective states'
child abuse and neglect reporting provisions by tying into existing
child abuse and neglect laws and triggering the usual process of
reporting and investigation. 34 However, these provisions differ in the
strength and scope of their application.
The Illinois and Minnesota statutes are the most far-reaching.
The Illinois child abuse and neglect statute deems a child neglected
whenever the mere presence of a controlled substance is found in an
provides in relevant part:
[Piroof that a person repeatedly misuses a drug or drugs or alcoholic
beverages, to the extent that it has or would ordinarily have the effect of
producing in the user thereof a substantial state of stupor, unconsciousness,
intoxification, hallucination, disorientation, or incompetence, or a substantial impairment of judgment, or a substantial manifestation of irrationality,
shall be prima facie evidence that a child of. . . such a person is a neglected
child....
131. See N.Y. FAmmy COURT ACT § 1012 (McKinney 1983) (practice commentary) (citing In re John Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 354, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797, 805 (Fain.
Ct. 1969).) ("To give rise to such [withdrawal] symptoms, the mother must have
been regularly using large quantities of heroin ... for considerable time before [the
child's birth] ....
Only high tolerance . . . for both mother and baby would cause
the medically observed course of events found here.") See also In re Vanessa F,
Infant, 76 Misc. 2d 617, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sur. Ct. 1974).
132. Some courts have held that parental rights may be terminated solely on the
basis of the mother's prenatal drug use. In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d
331 (1985); In re Milland, 146 Misc. 2d 1, 548 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1990); and In re
Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1990). However, at least
one other court has ruled that the mother's prenatal drug use-is only relevant to the
issue of neglect insofar as it indicates the child's welfare is presently jeopardized by
the mother's continued drug use after birth. In re Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d 333, 533
N.Y.S.2d 241 (1988). See also supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
133. Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Utah.
See infra note 134.
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.503(1), (9)(a)2 (West Supp. 1990), and 415.504
(West 1986 & Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 2053 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1 (West Supp. 1990); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 119, § 51A
(West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.556, 5561, and 5562) (West Supp.
1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846.A (West Supp. 1991); and UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-4-504 (Michie 1989).
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infant's blood or urine.'35 The child need not exhibit withdrawal
symptoms or any other physical manifestations of prenatal drug

exposure. 3 6 The comparable Minnesota law provides that neglect may
be established by withdrawal symptoms, a positive toxicology test, or
medical indices of drug-related impairment which is discovered in the
first year of a child's life. 37 Thus, both states recognize that some
infants have been adversely affected by prenatal drug exposure but
do not exhibit the symptoms at birth.' 38 These two states also allow

some form of state intervention during pregnancy. 39
The other five states with laws designed to address the cocaine
baby problem' 40 require a greater degree of proof before the reporting

statutes are triggered and allow state intervention only after birth.

Three of these states do not expressly include a newborn's drugdependency in their definitions of abuse or neglect even though reports
of drug-dependency are required.' 4' These states also require proof of
135. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 2053.e (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (.'Neglected
child' means any child ... who is a newborn infant whose blood or urine contains
any amount of controlled substance ....
).
136. For instance, in Illinois a report is to be made if "any amount" of a
controlled substance shows up in child's blood or urine. The report is required even
if the woman had used a drug only once and the child exhibited no signs of drugdependency. Id.
137. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 subd.2(c) (West Supp. 1991) states:
"Neglect" includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance ...

used by

the mother for a nonmedical purpose, as evidenced by withdrawal symptoms
in the child at birth, results of a toxicology test performed on the mother
at delivery or the child at birth, or medical effects or developmental delays
during the child's first year of life that medically indicate prenatal exposure
to a controlled substance.
138. By defining neglect as including children who exhibit the effects of prenatal
drug use within one year of birth, only the Minnesota statute accounts for the fact
that urine toxicology tests may and often do fail to detect instances of prenatal drug
exposure. Urine tests will not detect cocaine or crack unless the mother used the
drugs within one week of delivery. Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (prepared summary
of Neal Halfon, M.D.).
139. See infra notes 153-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislation which applies during pregnancy.
140. Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Utah. See supra note 134.
141. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §§ 51A, SIB (West Supp. 1990) (listed
only in the reporting provision separate from abuse and neglect); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 845.B.1 (West Supp. 1991) (not included in the definition of abuse and
neglect in the reporting provision); tit. 10, § 1101(4) (West Supp. 1991) (included in
the definition of "deprived" for purposes of adjudicating a termination of parental
rights); and UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-4-504 (Michie 1989) (listed separately from
abuse and neglect in the reporting provision) 78-3a-2(15) (Michie Supp. 1990) (not
included in the definition of abuse and neglect in the provision granting juvenile
court jurisdiction).
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neglect or abuse beyond mere drug-dependence at birth in order to

terminate parental rights.' 42 Therefore, even though a drug dependent

newborn has suffered catastrophic injury prior to birth, the state will

not allow a termination of parental rights unless an investigation

produces evidence of abuse or neglect that occurs after birth.
Two of the states go a little further. Florida specifically defines
43
drug-dependency at birth as evidence of actual abuse or neglect.
Similarly, Indiana does not differentiate fetal or infant drug-dependency from other forms of improper treatment.'" Therefore, the
Indiana and Florida laws presumably allow proceedings to be initiated
to terminate parental rights on the basis of infant drug-dependency
alone.' 4 In this respect, these states weigh prenatal drug use more
heavily against the mother than the previous three states do. However,
like the previous three states, Florida and Indiana would not allow
state intervention on proof short of drug-dependency even though the
mere presence of illicit drugs in a newborn's system may indicate
significant impairment.
Of the seven statutes discussed above, five of them are clearly
inadequate. The five states which require actual drug-dependency at
birth fail to recognize that adverse prenatal drug exposure may not
result in signs of drug-dependency at birth.'4 Infant drug-dependency
occurs only in the most egregious cases - when the mother used

142. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 119, § 51B(l) (West Supp. 1990) (proof must
be shown that a child's health and safety is in "immediate danger"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3a-2(15) (Michie Supp. 1990) (fetal drug-dependency and fetal alcohol
syndrome are not listed as abuse or grounds which may properly be considered by a
juvenile court in the adjudication of permanent custody. Some other charges are
needed to get a case before the juvenile court); and OKLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 10,
§ 1101(4) (West Supp. 1991) (the parents must also have willfully failed to provide
proper care and treatment).
143. According to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(1) (West Supp. 1990) an abused
or neglected child is defined as "a child whose physical or mental health or welfare
is harmed, or threatened with harm, by acts or omissions of the parent ..... " Section
415.503(4)(a)(2) provides that harm to a child's health or welfare may occur when a
parent inflicts an injury upon the child which includes "[p]hysical dependency of a
newborn infant upon any controlled substance .... "
144. IND. CODE Am. § 31-6-4-3, 3.1 (West Supp. 1990) (Various indicia of
improper treatment are grouped together including fetal alcohol syndrome, fetal drug
dependency, abnormal development, and life threatening conditions.).
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503 (West Supp. 1990) and IND. CODE ANN. § 316-4-3.1 (West Supp. 1990).
146. See, e.g., In re Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Fam. Ct.)
(child tested positive for drugs but did not exhibit withdrawal symptom).
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47
drugs continuously and incessantly throughout the whole pregnancy.
Three of these statutes would not even allow a termination of parental
rights on the basis of infant drug-dependency without some other
evidence of abuse or neglect.2 4 The two remaining states, Illinois and
Minnesota, allow state action on the basis of a positive toxicology
test at birth.149 However, even that is inadequate: a positive toxicology
test will only result when the mother has used drugs within one week
of delivery 5 ° and may fail to reveal as many as half of the cases of
prenatal drug exposure.' 5 1 Only Minnesota recognizes that adverse
prenatal drug exposure may not result in drug-dependency or a
15 2
positive toxicology test at birth.

C.

MEASURES INTENDED TO PREVENT PRENATAL HARM

The legislation in Illinois and Minnesota stands out from the
other states' efforts, not only because these statutes trigger state
action after birth on less proof, but because they are designed to
prevent the harm of fetal drug exposure through government intervention before birth. In addition, these states present two significantly
different views of the government's legitimate role in that process. 5 3
The Illinois legislation reflects the view that state intervention during
pregnancy to protect the fetus from drug exposure is limited to noncoercive means. 5 4 The Minnesota legislation illustrates the view that
more coercive means to protect the fetus are necessary and appropri-

ate. 15

1. PERSUASIVE AND NON-COERCIVE PRENATAL ACTION
In addition to the creation of child neglect laws that protect
prenatally drug-exposed infants at birth, the Illinois legislation allows
147. See In re John Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 354, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797, 805
(Fam. Ct.) (including a judge's observation that only regular use of large quantities
of heroin can give rise to withdrawal symptoms).
148. See supra note 141 and accompanying text referring to the Massachusetts,
Oklahoma, and Utah statutes.
149. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 2053.e (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 626.556 subd.2(c)(West Supp. 1991).
150. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (statement by Dr. Neal Halfon).
151. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 46 (statement by Dr. Neal Halfon).
152. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 subd.2(c) (West Supp. 1991) (recognizing

that prenatal drug exposure may not be diagnosed until as late as one year after

birth).
153. Compare infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text with infra notes 164178 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.

155. See infra notes 164-178 and accompanying text.
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state involvement prior to birth. This legislation mandates the development of a model comprehensive prenatal care and drug treatment
program for pregnant addicts"16 and an ongoing educational effort to
inform pregnant women about the medical consequences of drug,
alcohol, and tobacco use during pregnancy. 5 7 In addition, Chapter
23, paragraph 5-5 of the Illinois Public Aid Code permits medical
and health care providers to recommend pregnant women suspected
of drug abuse or addiction to a local drug treatment provider.5 8 That
provision also ensures that the cost of any subsequent treatment or
care will be covered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid for
anyone otherwise eligible for Medicaid.' 5 9
The Illinois provisions are attempts to encourage pregnant women
to seek and obtain prenatal care and drug treatment. Currently, the
Illinois approach to preventing fatal harm from drug exposure is
purely persuasive and non-coercive. The only coercive measures are
the child neglect provisions of the Illinois Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act, which apply after birth and may result in the termination of parental rights.' 60 In a nutshell, the Illinois approach is to
make prenatal care and drug treatment available and to encourage its
161
use.
2.

COERCIVE PRENATAL GOVERNMENT ACTION

At present, only Minnesota employs coercive prenatal measures
to allay the problem of fetal drug-dependency. Like Illinois and other
states, 62 the Minnesota legislation includes child protection laws which
apply after birth and are triggered by evidence of fetal drug exposure. 63 However, unlike any other state, the Minnesota statute provides for forced drug treatment for pregnant drug users.
156. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. Ill 1/2, 6354-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (set up in
an area of Cook County that has a high percentage of addicted women and a high
infant mortality rate).
157. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122,
158. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,

863 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
5-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).

159. Id.
160. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 2053 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) and ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, 2055 (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1990).
161. Drug treatment for pregnant women has been notoriously lacking for years.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Any comprehensive campaign to fight the
problem of infant prenatal drug exposure must include drug treatment programs
specifically designed for pregnant women and their unique concerns. See generally
Hearing, supra note 3, at 110-119 (statement by Wendy Chavkin, M.D., M.P.H.).
162. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
163. See MNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 subd.2 (West Supp. 1990).
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Under the reporting provision of the child neglect statute, any
person required to report child abuse or neglect must make an
immediate report to the local welfare agency when that person "knows
or has reason to believe that a woman is pregnant and has used a
controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy. " 64 The welfare agency shall conduct an investigation upon
receiving a report and offer services including referral to drug abuse
treatment and prenatal care providers. 65 In addition, any woman
found to have been using drugs may be subject to involuntary
commitment in a secure drug rehabilitation center under the Minnesota
Commitment Act of 1982.'66 Pursuant to the reporting provision of
the neglect statute, the welfare agency has been granted the specific
authority to seek an "emergency admission" of such a woman into a
drug rehabilitation center under the commitment statute. 67 Furthermore, the agency is requiredto seek such an involuntary commitment
when a woman "refuses recommended voluntary services or fails
recommended treatment."' ' 6
The Minnesota legislation operates much more aggressively than
the Illinois provisions. Under the Illinois Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act, reports are required only after the birth of drugexposed babies.' 69 Under the Illinois Public Code, health care providers are expressly permitted, but not required, to refer pregnant
women to drug treatment. 70 No provision is made in Illinois to force
compliance with a referral. In Minnesota, reports must be made for
suspected drug-using pregnant women 7' as well as drug-exposed in164. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 subd.l (The same information may also be
volunteered by any other person.).
165. See id. subd.2.
166. See id. (tying the reporting provision into the Minnesota Commitment Act
of 1982, found at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B (West Supp. 1990)).
167. See id. The legislation necessarily presumes that appropriate treatment
facilities are available or will be made available. Presumably, a woman cannot be
held liable for refusing services or failing treatment that is not available. Such an
involuntary commitment may last no longer than six month. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.09 (West Supp. 1990).
168. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626-5561 subd.2 (West Supp. 1990). The definition
of a "chemically dependent person" who is subject to involuntary commitment
includes "a pregnant woman who has engaged during pregnancy in habitual or
excessive use, for a nonmedical purpose, of any of the following controlled substances
or their derivatives: cocaine, heroin, phencyclidine, methamphetamine, or amphetamine." See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 subd.2 (West Supp. 1990).
169. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para 2053 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).
170. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 5-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).

171. See

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 626.5561 (West Supp. 1990).
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fants. 72 Upon receiving the report of a pregnant drug user, the welfare
agency is required to refer her to a drug treatment program. 73 If the
woman refuses or fails to comply voluntarily with the referral, she74
may be ordered by a court into a secure drug rehabilitation center.
Where the Illinois legislation leaves off (with persuasion) the Minnesota legislation picks up (with coercion).
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Minnesota legislation
is that it implicitly recognizes and weighs the interests of the state and
fetus to be of greater import than the interests of pregnant addicts.
According to the Minnesota Commitment Act "emergency treatment"
means treatment of a patient "which is necessary to protect the
patient or others from immediate harm.' ' 75 Thus, a woman or a man,
pregnant or non-pregnant, could be involuntarily committed for being
deemed dangerous to herself or himself as the statute stood before
the specific inclusion of pregnant women. 76 With the specific inclusion
of pregnant women in the commitment statute and the link between
the Minnesota child abuse reporting statute and the involuntary
commitment statute, 77 the scheme was clearly designed for the purpose
of protecting a pregnant woman's fetus. Thus, the statute signifies
the legislature's determination that a fetus' interest in being free from
exposure to drugs and the state's interest in protecting the quality of
fetal life outweigh a pregnant woman's interest to be 7 free from
government intrusion at some judicially determined point.1
V.

DISCUSSION OF EFFECTIVENESS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

The vast majority of the state court decisions and legislation
presented above have attempted to remedy the effects of prenatal
172. See

MNN. STAT. ANN.

§ 626.556 (West Supp. 1990).

173. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 subd.2 (West Supp. 1990).
174. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1990).
175. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 subd.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
176. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 subd. 2 (West 1982) (including the
inability to manage one's own affairs and the threat of a "substantial likelihood" of

harm to one's self or others as evidenced by an actual attempt to harm or threaten
to harm one's self or another, "recent serious physical problems," and "a failure to
provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care .... ).
177. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 subd.2 (West Supp. 1990) (tying the
reporting provision to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (The
Minnesota Commitment Act)).

178. For a discussion of the constitutionality of prenatal government action see

infra notes 238-316 and accompanying text.
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drug use by state intervention only after birth.179 Judicial attempts to
extend existing child abuse or neglect laws to protect fetuses have
been unsuccessful because of a lack of explicit statutory authorization.'80 Significantly, in two cases where the courts refused to assert
jurisdiction before birth, the respective judges opined that legislation
granting the authority to protect fetuses from maternal drug use
would be legitimate, and even desirable.' 8 ' However, most states have
formed no policy and passed no legislation to address the problem.8 2
A.

A CONCERN FOR AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY

When one contemplates the number of children born every year
struggling with the complications of in utero drug exposure 8 3 the
incentive is great to seek the most effective remedy possible. However,
the effectiveness and validity of the various ways to combat the
problem of prenatal drug exposure, both prior to and after birth, are
a matter of debate. A great many experts agree that the solution
requires a comprehensive response, including government supported
educational programs, prenatal health care, and drug treatment programs designed for pregnant women.'" Federal legislators have begun
to discuss ways to implement these recommendations,'
and a few
states have already implemented education, health care, and drug
treatment programs.' 6 However, while most experts agree that education, health care, and drug treatment should be a part of any
179. See supra notes 61-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of court
decisions and notes 133-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislation.
180. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text for examples of cases refusing
to assert jurisdiction on behalf of fetuses without explicit statutory authorization.
181. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
182. At this writing, only seven states have passed statutes specifically designed
to address the problem of infant drug-dependency. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. Five of the states have laws which become effective only after birth after the harm is done. See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text. Only two
states provide for responsive action during the critical stage of pregnancy. See supra
notes 156-178 and accompanying text. Only Minnesota allows the state to compel the
unwilling pregnant addict to get the treatment she needs to eliminate the danger of
prenatal exposure to her developing child. See supra notes 162-178 and accompanying
text. No state has passed legislation employing the use of criminal laws, and nearly
80% of the states have done nothing to address the cocaine baby problem.
183. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (375,000 in 1988) and notes 2338 and accompanying text (noting the adverse effects on children).
184. See generally Hearing, supra note 3 (discussing ways to implement these
recommendations).
185. See Hearing, supra note 3.
186. See, e.g., supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
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comprehensive plan to fight prenatal drug exposure, disagreement
exists whether these responses should be the only or primary solu87
tions. 1

Evidence suggests that persuasion is inadequate, alone, to solve

the problem of prenatal drug exposure.' 88 Washington D.C. has
boasted the most comprehensive plan in the country to combat infant

mortality, 8 9 including free prenatal care, evening hours, a hotline,
child care, and guaranteed appointments within two weeks.' 9° Never-

theless, the effort has proved to be ineffective because the women

most in need of the programs, the addicts, are not taking advantage
of the programs. 9' Unfortunately, all too often, a chemically depend-

187. See Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of Perinatal Substance Abuse,
Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Family, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) at 133-140 (debate). Jeff Parness, Professor at Northern
Illinois University College of Law, suggests that criminal sanctions are an appropriate
government response, and not therapy. Id. at 138. People need to be held accountable
for the harm they cause to others; we do not have the money needed to spend on
government provided care and treatment as a primary solution. Id. at 138-39.
Professor Parness asserts that criminal laws would serve to educate, deter future
conduct, and establish a clear social policy that would provide guidance in the
application of civil laws. Id. See also Sherman, supra note 3 at 28 (reporting a
comment by Susan Galbraith, assistant Washington, D.C. representative for the
National Council on Alcoholism, that if the government funded all the programs it
approved, about $30 million would be needed, and not the $4.5 million the government had allocated.). Dr. Wendy Chavkin and Margaret Gallen, CNM, MSN, assert
the belief that treatment and care provided by the government is the only alternative,
and criminal laws would drive these women away from the care they need. Id. at
139. Dr. Haynes Rice suggests we need both "the carrot and the stick": drug
treatment centers should be available for those who want treatment, but we need
coercive measures for those women who will not seek the care they need. Id.
188. See Hulbert, supra note 45, at 19 and Hearing supra note 187, at 104
(prepared statement by Parness).
189. High infant mortality may exist in combination with and may be due, in
part, to a high incidence of drug abuse. See generally Hulbert, supra note 45 (noting
the interrelationship). See also, In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 147 Misc. 2d 551, 553,
558 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (Fam. Ct. 1990) (citing a survey by the National Association
for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education).
190. See Hulbert, supra note 45, at 19.
191. Dr. Reed Tuckson, the D.C. Health Commissioner, is reported as commenting that, even though visits to clinics rose over the last year, the many problems
including drug abuse have "dwarfed" the efforts. The Commissioner further claims
that making prenatal care and drug treatment readily accessible is not enough, that
the service providers will be left 'twiddling [their] thumbs' because women who
need the care and the treatment simply will not come. In fact, those who need it the
most, especially pregnant addicts, are the most "elusive." Hulbert, supra note 45, at

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. I11

ent woman's unborn child is not her priority; 92 the drugs become an
all-consuming passion. l9 As a result of the sobering realization that
these efforts are not enough, the campaign has resorted to more
aggressive means, including the implementation of Maternity Outreach
Mobiles (MOM vans) in which service providers seek out and attempt
to persuade pregnant women to come in for help. 94
The increase in cocaine and crack use among pregnant woman 95
has accentuated the problem because of their highly addictive quality' 96
and peculiarly insidious psychological effects. 97 Cocaine and crack
seem to undermine the maternal instinct, 98 and their increased abuse
among pregnant women has led to ever larger numbers of abandoned
babies. 99 Many of these babies are abandoned in the hospital, 200
adding to overcrowding problems, 20' and eventually overburdening
foster care systems. 20 2 The sheer numbers are overwhelming, 20 and
the long term consequences for the children affected and society in

general are tremendous. 204 Given these facts, a plan relying on voluntary cooperation by addicts falls short as an adequate remedy.
Prenatal care and drug treatment programs are vital, 2°1 but they are
192. Hulbert, supra note 45, at 20 (referring to a social worker's observation to
the Washington Post).
193. Hulbert, supra note 45, at 20. See also supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
194. See Hulbert, supra note 45, at 19 "[A]n over optimistic medical campaign
is becoming a more sober social resource effort.").
195. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
196. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
197. See Comment, supra note 2, at 398-99. See also supra note 21 and

accompanying text.
198. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
199. See Hearing, supra note 187, at 124-128 (statement by Dr. Haynes Rice)
(explaining the recent phenomenon of "boarder babies" that has occurred as a result
of the increasing incidence of cocaine and crack use among pregnant women) and
Comment, supra note 2, at 398-99 n.33 (citing Trost, Born to Lose: Babies of Crack
Users Crowd Hospitals, Break Everybody's Heart, Wall St. J., July 18, 1989, at AI,
A6 (Midwest ed.)).
200. See, Hearing, supra note 187, at 124-28 (statement by Dr. Haynes Rice).
201. Supra note 40 and accompanying text (examples of overcrowding caused
by drug abusers abandoning their babies in the hospital).
202. Supra note 39 and accompanying text (example of how foster care systems
are affected by the cocaine baby problem).
203. Supra notes 5 and 13-15 and accompanying text (a discussion of the number
of babies affected).
204. Supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (a discussion of the long term
effects of prenatal drug exposure).
205. Hearing, supra note 187, at 117 (statement by Dr. Wendy Chavkin) (Drug

1990:73]

PRENATAL GOVERNMENT ACTION - THE COCAINE BABY

101

inadequate if addicts will not use them. Education and drug awareness
programs are also important, but they are not new tactics. In spite of
the education and awareness programs in the past, the drug problem
has grown and continues to grow. 2 6
The difficult problem of prenatal drug use may demand extraordinary measures. 2°7 Some experts advocate criminal sanctions. 2° The
purposes of criminal sanctions would be to educate, deter future
conduct, and serve as a statement of public policy upon which courts
may rely in applying civil laws.2 Furthermore, criminal penalties
might be used as the catalyst for the rehabilitation of pregnant
addicts. 210 The offender could choose in-patient treatment as an
alternative to imprisonment or be given probation with treatment as
a condition of her probation. 21 ' The legal threat may even be the

impetus that is needed for successful rehabilitation."'
However, many commentators view criminal action against women
2'1 4
in this context with alarm.2 1 Aside from constitutional concerns,
the main objection to criminal action against maternal drug users is
that it will be counter-productive. 25 Some experts fear that pregnant
treatment programs specifically tailored for pregnant women have been notoriously
few in the past and are essential to help the addict overcome her drug dependency.).
206. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
207. See Comment, supra note 2, at 402-403 nn.55-57.
208. See generally Comment, supra note 2, (advocating criminal sanctions); and
Hearing, supra note 187, at 104 (statement by Professor Parness).
209. Hearing, supra note 187, at 134 (statement by Parness).
210. See Comment, supra note 2, at 407 n.89 ("The state can coerce treatment
by 'exploit[ing] the opportunities presented by the conviction or compulsory detention
of offenders."') (citing H.L. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 26 (6th ed. 1984) (quoting Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-665 (1962)).
211. See Comment, supra note 2, at 410.
212. See Comment, supra note 2, at 410.
213. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 187, at 110 (statement by Wendy Chavkin,
M.D., M.P.H., Rockefeller fellow, Sergievsky Center, Columbia University School
of Public Health, New York, New York); Fetal Abuse, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 3839; and Sherman, Keeping Baby Safe from Mom, 11 Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 1,
24 (including a rare coalition of feminists and pro-life advocates).
214. Compare Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: the Case Against the
Criminalizationof "Fetal Abuse", 101 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1988) with Comment,
Criminal Liability of a Prospective Mother for Prenatal Neglect of a Viable Fetus, 9
WHITTIER L. REv. 363 (1987).
215. See generally Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAW,
MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 114 (Summer 1989) and Note, The Criminalization of
Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawyers, 64 IND.
L.J., 357, 369-73 (1989).
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drug users will avoid medical help in order to escape potential criminal
prosecution. 216 Criminal sanctions pit mother against child and doctor
against mother, undermining the very network of relationships which
normally protect the welfare of the unborn. 2 7 Others fear that criminal
sanctions will force pregnant drug users to seek abortions rather than
face possible criminal charges. 218 Of course, if the criminal sanctions
are tailored to apply only when treatment is refused, pregnant addicts
would not have to avoid their doctors or obtain an abortion in order
to escape the criminal penalties.
Nevertheless, criminal sanctions may ultimately be ineffective.
Many pregnant drug users would be caught. For them, the legal action
may, indeed, provide the catalyst for their rehabilitation and may act
to deter them from drug use in the future. But, how many other
pregnant addicts would be driven away from getting the care they
need? The addictive nature of illicit drugs, especially cocaine and
crack, is such that many addicts might rather avoid prenatal care than
risk being turned in to the state. Pregnant addicts who are convicted
would also carry the stigma of a criminal conviction. Of course,
criminal laws may have a general deterrent effect, but drug users
already face the prospect of criminal penalties. Adding another penalty
for pregnant drug users may not have any more of a deterrent effect
than current laws.
Another way to approach the problem is through the application
of child abuse laws. Some critics of criminal sanctions. also view the
imposition of child abuse laws with suspicion. 2 9 They claim that
women will be deterred from seeking medical and other treatment by
the prospect of losing the child to the state. 220 Nevertheless, the
application of child abuse laws to prenatal drug use has many
proponents. 22' Many hospitals in major metropolitan areas routinely
screen infants for the presence of drugs, and the results are often
reported to local child protective services as a matter of policy. 222
216. See Hearing, supra note 187, at 112 (statement by Chavkin); Field, supra
note 215, at 121; and Note, supra note 215, at 369-73.
217. See Field, supra note 215, at 121.
218. See Marcotte, Crime and Pregnancy, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 14, 16.
219. See e.g., Field, supra note 215, at 114; King, Should Mom Be Constrained
in the Best Interests of the Fetus?, 13 NOVA L. REv. 393 (1989).
220. See Field, supra note 215, at 121; King, supra note 218 at 403.
221. See, e.g., Shaw, ConditionalPerspective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 63 (1984); and Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State
Interfere?, 23 DuQ L. REv. 1 (1984); Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse: The
Need to Provide Legal Protectionfor the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209 (1987).
222. See, e.g., Sherman, Keeping Baby Safe from Mom, 11 Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3,
1988, at 1, 24.
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Custody proceedings that follow those reports many times result in
the baby being taken away from the mother on a basis other than the
prenatal drug use.223 In addition, a number of states have already
passed legislation which mandates reporting and allows courts to
terminate mothers' parental rights solely or partially on the basis of
their prenatal drug use. 224 Post birth terminations of parental rights
may be necessary to prevent a prenatally drug-exposed child from
future harm, and the prospect of losing one's parental rights may
have a general deterrent affect on prenatal drug use.
However, the post birth application of child abuse laws is ultimately inadequate as a preventive measure. Logically, it is more
effective to prevent harm from occurring than to treat it once it has
occurred. Post birth parental rights adjudications may prevent further
harm to the children exposed to drugs before birth, but they do not
225
prevent a child's immediate suffering and possible life-long impair. 6 It also does not alleviate the societal burden associated with
ment?
prenatal drug exposure.n 7 Furthermore, while the prospect of losing
custody of one's child may deter some women from using drugs
2 8 Many of these
during pregnancy, many more will be undeterred.
2 29
women will abandon their babies in the hospital after they are born.
The woman who knows what drug use will do to her baby, and does
it anyway, may not even be deterrable. Considering the doubtful
deterrent effect of child abuse laws on prenatal drug use, they may
not be an effective preventative measure.
When drug using pregnant women refuse to get proper treatment
in spite of efforts at education, persuasion, and the threat of post
223. See id.
224. See supra notes 133-152 and accompanying text for a general discussion of

child abuse and neglect legislation that applies to prenatal drug exposure.

225. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the short

term and long term effects of prenatal drug exposure on children.
227. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for examples of how society
must bear the burden of caring and providing for prenatally drug exposed children.

228. The combination of the highly addictive quality of cocaine and crack and
their insidious psychological effect that undermines the maternal instinct reduces the

probability that a woman addicted to those drugs would be induced to quit by the

threat of losing custody of her child once it is born. See supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text for an explanation of the addictive quality and psychological
effects of cocaine and crack use.
229. See supranote 199 and accompanying text for a discussion of abandonment
of drug-exposed babies by their mothers. Cf. note 40 and accompanying text
(discussing the impact of drug exposed babies on hospital space).
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birth parental rights terminations and criminal penalties, nothing short
of forced care and treatment will be effective to prevent or minimize
the harm of prenatal drug exposure. 230 Inevitably, whether government
action takes the form of educating, providing care and treatment,
terminating parental rights, imposing criminal penalties, or any combination of these remedies, an effective governmental response will
include court ordered drug rehabilitation and possible detention for
pregnant addicts. 23' Since most experts agree that free and accessible
prenatal care and drug treatment programs are a part of the solution, 23 2 forcing the pregnant women to comply with these programs
will not add significantly to the cost of addressing the prenatal drug
abuse problem. The programs should already be established.
The government has at least two available means by which to
compel prenatal care and drug treatment: the government can criminalize prenatal drug use and impose prenatal care and drug treatment
as a part of sentencing, 23 3 or the government can utilize existing child
abuse and neglect laws and give courts the authority to order civil
confinement that would include prenatal care and drug treatment. 23 4
Civil confinement is the much more appealing option because it does
not carry the social stigma of criminalization. It also offers the courts
more flexibility to tailor the remedy to suit the individual woman.
230. See Hulbert, supra note 45, at 21:
Inevitably, a paternalistic intrusiveness is an inherent part of the more
comprehensive programs, which aim in effect to play the role of an ideal
father of a woman's baby, of a full and healthy family: to be a provider of
all kinds of practical help, and a source of ... [vigilant concern and
protection] ....
This paternalism may seem old-fashioned, but especially

when it comes to teenagers and drug abusers, it isn't misplaced. Assertive
guidance shouldn't be hard to justify for women so ill-equipped to protect
their babies.
The starting point, she claims, is to get the drug-addicted woman to see her
responsibility to her fetus by "forced withdrawal from drugs, to give her baby the
chance of at least a few months in a non-toxic womb." Hulbert, supra note 45, at
21. See also Hearing, supra note 3, at 139 (statement by Dr. Haynes Rice).
Court ordered confinement for prenatal care and drug treatment may be accomplished through the use of criminal laws. See generally Comment, supra note 2. Civil
laws may also be used. Supra, notes 163-177 and accompanying text (explaining the
Minnesota child abuse laws which tie into the involuntary commitment statute for
purposes of forcing pregnant addicts to remain drug free and to receive drug treatment
during pregnancy).
231. See Field, supra note 215, at 120 ("Detention is the only apparent preventative device that might effectively handle drug or alcohol consumption .. .
232. See generally Hearing, supra note 3.
233. See generally Comment, supra note 2.

234. See supra notes 163-177 and accompanying text (discussing the Minnesota
approach).
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Reports of prenatal drug use would be required by those people
obligated to report child abuse or neglect, and voluntary reports
would be allowed by anyone not otherwise required by statute to
report. 235 Either way, the mother would be subject to a few months
forced treatment in order to save her child from a possible lifetime
of hardship and suffering.2 36 If the mother will not help herself, at
least she will not pass on a legacy of pain and suffering to her child.
The potential burden on schools, foster care systems, mental institu237
tions, and other government funded institutions may also be prevented by a few months forced prenatal care and drug treatment. Of
course, parental rights adjudications may still be necessary if the
mother (or father) fails to remain drug free after birth and their
continued drug use adversely affects their child.
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH COERCIVE PRENATAL ACTION

However pragmatic forced compliance seems, it raises various
constitutional concerns. Government interference with a woman's
pregnancy has been a sensitive subject since the landmark decision in
Roe v. Wade. 238 In the present context, courts have been unsure how
to treat prenatal drug use for purposes of post-natal parental rights
determinations. 239 Some courts have refused to assert jurisdiction over
a pregnant womanm° or a fetus241 at least partly because of constitutional concerns.
Since the first recognition of a privacy right in the Constitution
v. Connecticut, 2 the umbrella of privacy rights has been
Griswold
in
expanded. These privacy rights, at a minimum, cover decisionmaking
3
freedom in the areas of marital relationships, 24 procreation, 2" and
235. See, e.g., the Minnesota reporting statute.

MINN. ANN. STAT.

§ 626.5561

(West Supp. 1991).

236. See pages 6-7 and accompanying notes 33-38.
237. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the burden on
and cost to society).
238. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959.
239. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text (discussing courts' uncertainty
over the proper handling of prenatally drug-exposed babies).
240. See Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 42 Ohio App. 3d 171, 175, 537
N.E.2d 721, 725 (1988) (refusing to assert jurisdiction in the absence of legislative
authority on constitutional grounds).
241. See In re Dittrick, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977) (not reaching

the constitutional issues).

242. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

243. See, e.g., Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that state laws

may not operate effectively to deny couples access to the courts to get a divorce).
244. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959.
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parenting.2 5 These privacy rights have been protected by application
of the equal protectionm and due process247 clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. 2a Also implicated is the general due process liberty right
to bodily autonomy or bodily integrity2 9
1. THE SEARCH FOR A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Equal protection and substantive due process analysis of privacy
rights must begin with a discussion of fundamental rights. When no
fundamental right is involved, the court applies a minimum rationality
test in deference to the legislative discretion of Congress. However, if
the court finds a fundamental right, a strict standard of review is
applied; government interference with that right will only be upheld
if the state's interest, or objective, is "compelling," and the means
employed by the government is "necessary" to achieve that objec20
tive. 1
The search for a fundamental right, therefore, is the proper
starting point for a constitutional analysis of court ordered civil or
criminal confinement of chemically dependent pregnant women because the nature of the right determines the standard of review to be
applied and the level of government interest that must be asserted to
outweigh that right. The specific areas of privacy rights which might
be implicated by coercive government action during pregnancy include
procreation, parenting, and the liberty interest of bodily autonomy or
integrity. 2 1 In considering whether a fundamental right is involved,
one must be cognizant of the Court's cautionary admonition in Bowers
v. Hardwick3 2 against expanding the definition of privacy rights. 2 3
245. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
246. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
247. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
248. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

249. See Myers, supra note 221, at 57-58.
250. See J. NowAK, J.

ROTUNDA,

& J. Yotmo, CONSTrruToNAL

LAW

§ 14.3,

530-31 (3d ed. 1986).
251. Myers, supra note 221, at 57-58.
252. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039.
253. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986):
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots
in the language or design of the Constitution.... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of these Clauses [the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments] particularly if
it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.
Other wise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further authority to
govern the country without express constitutional authority.
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The Bowers Court warned that the judiciary comes very close to
overstepping its authority when it finds rights in the constitution
which are not expressed in the text of the constitution. 2 4 The Court,
then, proceeded to define the scope of fundamental rights. The
Bowers majority characterized fundamental rights in two ways: 1)
"fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,"' 25" and 2) "liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's

history and tradition."

'256

However, the way in which one frames the issue may be crucial
to the outcome that is reached. At issue in Bowers, according to the
majority, was the freedom to engage in homosexual sodomy.25 7 The
Court held that such a freedom is not a fundamental right according
to the definitional language provided. 28 Following the logic of the
Bowers decision, the issue in the context of prenatal drug abuse is 25a9
woman's freedom to use controlled substances during pregnancy.
Few people would seriously assert that such a freedom is "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." In fact, just the opposite is true. The history
and tradition of our nation includes the proscription of drug use.
Therefore, drug use, characterized in this way, would not be deemed
a fundamental right.
However, some advocates might characterize the interest involved
in more expansive terms. Justice Blackman, in his dissenting opinion
in Bowers, claimed the crux of the issue is a person's "right to be let
alone. '" 2w For Justice Blackmun, consensual sexual relationships of
any kind, between any adults, ought to be protected due to the
254. Id. at 194.
255. Id. at 191 (citing Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
256. Id. at 192 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
257. Id. at 190.
258. Id. at 190-96. Homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental freedom that is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." Id. at 191-92.
259. See In re Stephen W., 221 Cal. App. 3d 629, 641, 271 Cal. Rptr. 319, 325
(1990) ("We reject mother's argument to the effect that the right of pregnant addicts
to abuse drugs requires society to turn a blind eye to the plight of addicted

newborns.").
One might characterize the intrusion more broadly as involving the right to
conduct one's pregnancy free from government interference. However, legislation
which targets prenatal drug use, by definition, excludes all forms of conduct but
drug use. Other conduct such as smoking, eating, and so on is not implicated.
260. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986) (citing Justice Brandeis'
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
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intimately personal nature of the association. 26' In similar manner,
one might assert that a woman has a right "to be let alone" during

pregnancy. A strong argument can be made that the right to be let
alone is a fundamental freedom that is "implicit in the concept of an

ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and

tradition." Characterized in this way, court ordered confinement may
be seen as an interference with a woman's fundamental right to
privacy.

However, no discussion of the right to privacy during pregnancy
would be complete without a closer examination of the decision in
Roe v. Wade.262 Of course, the decision in Roe extended the definition
of privacy rights to include a woman's qualified right to terminate
her pregnancy. 263 Again, the characterization of the right protected in

Roe is subject to different interpretations. Some commentators assert
that Roe stands for nothing other than the protection of a woman's
right to abort her pregnancy. 264 As a result, the government is free to

interfere with a woman's pregnancy as long as that interference does

not intrude upon her freedom to choose an abortion. 265 A more
expansive interpretation is that Roe stands for the protection of a
woman's freedom to make "uncoerced decisions" regarding her pregnancy. 266
However, Roe itself, and subsequent cases, tend to indicate that
the court does not characterize that right as broadly as some have
261. Id. at 199-200.
262. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
263. The woman's right to an abortion may be limited or superceded by the
state after the fetus has reached viability. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).

264. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,

Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437 (1983) and Comment, supra
note 221, at 1219-20.
265. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156, 163 (1973). See also, In re A.C., 533
A.2d 611, 614 (D.C. App. 1987) ("[A]s a matter of law, the right of a woman to an
abortion is different and distinct from her obligations to the fetus once she has
decided not to timely terminate her pregnancy.").
266. Note, supra note 124, at 999 n.34. However, regarding a person's right to
choose how to conduct one's self, the constitutional protection is necessarily limited.
The protection generally ends where the conduct is potentially harmful to others or
limits another person's rights. For instance, the Constitution protects the right to
own and bear firearms, but that right may be limited for the protection of the safety
of others. Generally, people may not bear concealed firearms and felons may not
own or bear firearms at all. In the same way, prenatal drug abuse is harmful to
fetus' and potentially harmful to the pregnant addicts' children (if their fetuses are
carried to term). The harm caused is also borne by society.
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urged. First, the right protected in Roe is not absolute. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, conceded that the right to terminate one's pregnancy must be subject to limitation and even proscription at the point of viability. 267 A balance was struck between a
woman's right to choose an abortion and the government's interest
in protecting the potentiality of fetal life. The balance suggests an
implicit recognition that one person's rights often end where potential
harm to another person's rights begin. Although Roe declared that a
fetus is not a person for purposes of fourteenth amendment protection, 261 the law often works to protect the potentiality of fetal life in
nonabortion contexts, including wrongful death, prenatal tort, paternity, property, and dramshop actions. 269 One court has even upheld
270
the validity of a prenatal tort action by a child against his mother.
While a fetus is deemed not to be a person who has constitutional
rights, a child is a person and does have constitutional rights. Those
rights, however, are necessarily limited if no protection is given before
birth. 27' Therefore, although a woman may terminate her pregnancy
within the limitations allowed in Roe, she should not be able to harm
her fetus by prenatal drug abuse272 because that harm necessarily limits
the rights of her child if she carries it to term.
Second, the Court has not endorsed a theory of constitutional
freedom of choice in the abstract, to be applied without reference to
the conduct chosen. 273 The conduct must be significantly related to a

267. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156, 163 (1973).
268. Id. 163-64.

269. See supra notes 87 & 91 and accompanying text. See also Myers, supra
note 221, at 4-14 (chronicling legal protection of the unborn through property, tort,
and criminal laws).
Numerous courts have recognized the right that a child has to be born with a
sound mind and a sound body. See, e.g., infra note 314. See also Myers, supra note
221, at 60 ("[T]he unborn child possesses a right to gestation undisturbed by wrongful

injury, and a right to be born with a sound mind and body, free from parentally
inflicted abuse or neglect.").
270. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 401, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1980)
(for taking medicine during pregnancy that caused damage to his teeth after birth).
But see Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 280, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (1988),(no

cause of action exists for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries).
271. What is the difference to the child if the harm is caused one month before
birth or one month after? The injury is the same. See Comment, supra note 221, at
1223. To the extent a child is born suffering with the harmful effects of prenatal
exposure to drugs, that child's rights are already limited.

272. See Shaw, supra note 221, at 83 (A Woman's "failure to decide [to have
an abortion] should not relieve her of prenatal duties earlier in pregnancy.").
273. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). The decisions which are entitled
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traditional area of protection. 274 Where the conduct has been universally and traditionally prohibited, the fact that one is in the sensitive
condition of pregnancy does not add legitimacy to the act. This is
especially true where the conduct (drug use) bears no relation to the
nature of the protected right (procreation).
Finally, the Court has indicated a reluctance to expand the
category of fundamental rights beyond traditionally respected conduct
in the areas of family decisionmaking, procreation, and parenting. 275
Even the limited right established in Roe seems to be subject to further
limitation. 276 Far from giving privacy rights expansive application, the
current Court seems to be limiting the scope of constitutionally
protected privacy rights. Therefore, every indication is that no fundamental procreative privacy right is involved in drug use by pregnant

women.
Parental rights enjoy a longer history of recognition and protec-

tion than procreative rights. 277 However, it is well established that the
government may override parental rights in egregious cases.278 Thus,
while parental autonomy has been perceived as a fundamental right,
to protection are those which involve "matters relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." Id.
To extend the right to choose the specifically protected conduct of abortion to
other prenatal conduct may lead to illogical results. A comparison of abortion to
drug use serves as an illustration. Before Roe, abortion and drug use were both illegal
in Texas. The Roe decision allowed pregnant women to choose to have an abortion
without government interference. A similar application to drug use would result in
the protection of a pregnant woman's choice to use drugs free from government
interference. The Roe decision effectively legalized abortion for pregnant woman. A
similar application in the present context would effectively result in the legalization
of drug use for pregnant women. Unlike abortion, both men and women use drugs
and are subject to the criminal sanctions against it. Therefore, it makes little sense
to allow pregnant women to use drugs when drug use is a criminal offense for men
and non-pregnant women.
274. Id.
275. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
276. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) (statutory
ban on use of public employees and facilities for performing abortions did not
contravene the Constitution). See also Robertson, The Future of Early Abortion,

A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 73.
277. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)
(referring to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Neb., 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) as establishing parental rights as fundamental). See also J.
NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTtUTIONAL LAW § 11.7, at 371 n.26 (1986).
278. See Myers, supra note 221, at 22-24. Today, every state has child abuse
and neglect statutes. See id. at 24 (citing to S. KATZ, M. McGRATH & R. HowE,
CHILD NEGLECT LAWS IN AMERICA (1976) for a listing).
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the state's interest and obligation in protecting the welfare of children

can be superseding. 279 Again, one person's right (to parental autonomy) must end where another person's right (to be free from abuse

and neglect) begins. In fact, one commentator claims that it is the
very strength of the child abuse laws which validates an extension of
2 0
the child abuse and neglect laws for the protection of the unborn. 1

She urges, "A woman's right to abuse her own body and threaten

her own health should not extend to the body of her fetus." ' 28 ' At
least one advocate of women's rights during pregnancy concedes that
the need for legal intervention is probably stronger during pregnancy

because a fetus is more vulnerable than a child. 212 The notion of

parental autonomy is balanced in our society by a recognition of
parental responsibility. Thus, parental rights have correlative parental
duties which the state may enforce. 2 3 The fact that a woman may
have the right of parental autonomy available to her during pregnancy
as a shield against arbitrary government action actually reinforces the
state's position that it may properly use its parens patriae power 2 4 to

prevent her from committing egregious acts which will harm her
developing fetus. Drug abuse is certainly such an egregious act,

considering the terrible effects it has on the fetus.
Pregnant women also have significant autonomy interests. Individuals are generally protected from unwanted and "unjustified intrusions on personal security.' '285 This interest allows a competent adult
to refuse state-imposed medical treatment. 28 6 However, this right is
279. See id.
280. See Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED.
63, 99 (1984) ("The evolution and strength of child abuse laws lays the foundation
for intrusion into private family matters for protecting the fetus from deliberate or
conscious harmful acts.").
281. See id. at 104.
282. King, supra note 219, at 399 (advocating that pregnant women should not
be forced to undergo treatment on her fetus' behalf any more than one person should
be forced to donate an organ on another's behalf).
283. See Shaw, supra note 221, at 66 (including obligations to support, protect,
provide and to refrain from neglecting, abandoning, and abusing).
284. "'The parens patriae power ... is the state's limited paternalistic power to
protect or promote the welfare of certain individuals, like young children .. . who
lack the capacity to act in their own best interests."' Myers, supra note 221, at 22
(quoting Development in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1156, 1199 (1980)). See also Myers, supra note 221, at 22 n.93.
285. See, e.g., In Graham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (involving corporal
punishment in schools).
286. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), modified and
remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982)
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not absolute. 287 Thus, a pregnant woman might be ordered to undergo
a caesarean section 288 or a blood transfusion 28 9 for the benefit of her

unborn child. 290 Since liberty interests are highly regarded, Harvard
professor, Martha A. Field, asserts that unwanted government intervention may be justified only where the benefit to the child would
significantly outweigh the detriment to the woman. 29' In the case of

drug abuse, the benefit of a drug-free womb to the fetus is unquestionable. Drug rehabilitation for the woman, albeit against her will,
is also beneficial.
With respect to the Minnesota provisions, drug addicts are subject
to involuntary commitment if, by "clear and convincing" evidence,
they are deemed to be dangerous to themselves or to others. 292 The

government's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its
citizens is sufficient to outweigh the liberty interests of the individual
as long as the government affords that person due process and meets
the requisite standard of proof. 29a If people can legitimately be committed for their own benefit and to protect others from potential
harm, then pregnant women can legitimately be committed for their
own benefit and to protect their future or unborn children from
potential harm.
2.

EQUAL PROTECTION CONCERNS
Lawmakers and judges would be hard pressed to justify an
interpretation of the law that allows pregnant women amnesty to use
(involving the refusal of an involuntarily committed mental patient to take antipsychotic drugs); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 615-16 (D.C. App. 1987)(noting and holding
that a person's right to bodily integrity may be superceded in order to protect
innocent third parties)(citing Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
287. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3rd Cir. 1981) ("limited by ...
legitimate governmental concerns and obligations").
288. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86,
274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (per curiam).
289. See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985.
290. See generally Comment, The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A
Standard for Judicial Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065 (1983) (making a case for
forced medical treatment on behalf of a fetus).
291. See Field, supra note 215, at 120 (asserting for policy reasons that government intervention during pregnancy should never be used).
292. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.01, .09 subd.1 (West 1982). See also O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (a state cannot commit a person who is not
dangerous to himself or others).
293. See State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1980) (the state
must ensure a fair review).
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drugs while non-pregnant men and women are subject to criminal
penalties for the same conduct. On the other hand, legislation which
provides for court ordered confinement of pregnant drug users singles
out pregnant women who use drugs for extraordinary treatment.
Women are treated differently than men; pregnant women are treated
differently than non-pregnant women; and pregnant drug users are
treated differently than non-pregnant drug users. This type of disparate treatment is the crux of an equal protection concern.
Legislation which explicitly classifies and discriminates according
to gender is subject to a heightened form of scrutiny. 29 While
legislation aimed at pregnant addicts may not expressly classify according to gender, the practical effect is the disparate treatment of
women. Legislation which has a discriminatory effect may also be
subject to heightened scrutiny if a discriminatory purpose can be
shown. 295 However, mere awareness of the probable effect is not
sufficient to establish discriminatory purpose. The legislation must be
shown to have been enacted "because of," and not merely "in spite
of," the adverse effect on women .296 Without the requisite showing
of discriminatory purpose, the legislation is subject to no more than
27
a minimum rationality test. 9
Classification by the biological distinction of pregnancy does not
necessarily implicate gender discrimination. 298 Men and women are
obviously not similarly-situated with respect to pregnancy. Paternal
prenatal drug use does not have the same physiological effect on a
developing fetus as maternal prenatal drug has. 299 Consequently,
294. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124
(1977). ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of these objectives.").
295. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-73 (1979).
296. See id. at 278-79.

297. See id. at 281.
298. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) ("While it is true that
only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . .. "). The Geduldig
decision, as applied in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), was

overruled by Newport News Ship Bldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669
(1983). However, Geduldig v. Aiello, remains good law with respect to constitutional
claims of gender discrimination. Toomey v. Clark, 876 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir.

1989) (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) and Newport News
Ship Bldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677 (1983)).
299. However, to the extent that paternal drug use does effect the welfare of
the child, born or unborn, the father should be held responsible in the same way as
the mother. Thus, in In re Heidi S., 151 A.D.2d 578, 579, 542 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687

(1989), a court terminated the parental rights of a father based on a finding of drug
abuse one month prior to the child's birth.
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different treatment may be justified on the basis of pregnancy where
the treatment bears a rational relationship to the governmental objective or interest. 3°° The same justification applies between pregnant
women and non-pregnant women. The distinction survives the minimum rationality test.
3.

THE COMPETING INTERESTS

The government has at least two interests with respect to the
prenatal drug exposure: a concern for the health and welfare of
children30 and for minimizing the cost and burden on society. 0 2 In
addition, the government has an interest in fetal life which the Court
in Roe acknowledged as "important and legitimate" throughout
pregnancy 30 3 and "compelling" at viability. 3 4 Although the Roe Court
' 305
characterized it as an interest in the "potentiality of human life,
some experts have asserted that the state interest in the potentiality
of life logically extends to a state interest in the quality of fetal life. 306
Furthermore, this interest in protecting the quality of fetal life,
arguably, may co-exist with the woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. The state cannot act on its interest in the "potentiality"
of life until viability, because the woman has a perceived fundamental
procreative right to terminate her pregnancy. The state's interest in
37
the potentiality of life only becomes "compelling" at that point. 0
However, the state may act on its interest in the "quality of fetal
life" throughout pregnancy, because no fundamental right is implicated with respect to drug use. Therefore, the state's interest in the
300. See Geduldid v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974). But cf. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) and Turner v. Dept. of Employment,
423 U.S. 44 (1975).

301. This concern necessarily involves the government interest in the potentiality
of fetal life, the general interest in youth, and an interest in the preservation of life.
See Myers, supra note 221, at 17-21. The state may also have a legitimate interest in
maternal health as recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
302. See Comment, supra note 221, at 1221-25.
303. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). The state has an "important
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." Id. at 162.
However, the state's interest only becomes compelling at viability. Id. at 163.
304. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
305. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
306. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 221, at 19 ("The state's important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life' would be severely
undermined if it could require birth [at viability] but do nothing to ensure that the
life saved is worth living.")(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
307. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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quality of fetal life may be superseding throughout pregnancy. As
long as the state does not interfere with the woman's right and ability
to terminate her pregnancy, the state may be able to proscribe her
drug use in order to protect the quality of fetal development. 30 8 The
state has an "important and legitimate" interest in fetal life throughout pregnancy. 3°9 Therefore, with respect to drug use, the state's
interest may be superseding throughout pregnancy. As long as the
state does not interfere with the woman's right and ability to terminate
her pregnancy, the state may be able to proscribe her drug use in
310
order to protect the quality of fetal development.

In addition to pregnant women and the state, unborn children

have recognized interests as well. These interests may not receive the
protection of the fourteenth amendment,3 ' but they are substantial
nonetheless.31 2 Courts have recognized, inter alia, that unborn children
have a right to be free from prenatal wrongful injury caused by the
mother 313 and to be born with a sound mind and body. 314 Courts have
also recognized that states may sometimes interfere with a woman's
pregnancy for the benefit of the unborn child if the corresponding
detriment to the woman is not too severe.3" 5 The same protection
should be extended to the unborn with regard to maternal drug use.
Denying the fetus the right to be free from illicit drugs in the womb
32 6
is tantamount to denying that right to the child at birth.
308. See supra notes 250-276 and accompanying text.
309. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973).
310. Of course, women faced with the prospect of involuntary commitment still
have the abortion option available. They may choose to abort the fetus rather than
be forced to undergo treatment or detainment. Thus, in spite of the fact that much
harm could be avoided by early intervention, a case may be made for making forced
treatment effective only after viability when abortion can be proscribed.
311. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
312. See Myers, supra note 221, at 19 & 59-60 (referring to recent legal trend of
protecting fetal rights in non-abortion contexts).
313. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 400, 301 N.W.2d 869,
870 (1981).
314. See Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960). Accord,
In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322, 329, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (1990) (quoting
Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1969)); In re
Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 35, 500 N.E.2d 936, 939 (1986) (quoting In re Baby X,
97 Mich. App. 111, 115, 293 N.E.2d 736, 739 (1980) (citing Womack v. Buchhorn,
384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971))).
315. See, e.g., In re Jamaica Hospital, 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898
(Sup. Ct. 1985); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 89,
274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1981); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985.
316. See Myers, supra note 221, at 19 ("The state's 'important and legitimate
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CONCLUSION

Infant prenatal drug exposure is a problem which demands a
government response. The number of children born every year with
the adverse effects of prenatal drug exposure is too large to be ignored,
and that number is growing. These children deserve a better chance
in life than the fate thrust upon them before they take their first
breath. Although states have the ability to protect these future citizens
from the harmful consequences of prenatal drug exposure, very few
states have responded with legislation, and courts have been justifiably
unwilling to extend the needed protection in the absence of the
requisite statutory authority.
Fortunately, the harm is avoidable. Adequate and accessible
prenatal care and drug treatment for pregnant addicts is part of the
solution. The government can and should take a more active role in
seeing that pregnant women get the care and treatment they need.
However, free and accessible programs are inadequate if they are not
used. The invidious nature of drug addiction necessitates a more
extraordinary approach than friendly persuasion.
Criminal sanctions against women who give birth to drug exposed
babies is a dubious deterrent to drug use and might even have the
counter-productive effect of causing women to avoid getting the help
they and their unborn children need. Child abuse laws, though a
legitimate means of protecting children from further harm, are not
effective to prevent the harm of prenatal drug exposure. The only
effective way to prevent unborn children from being exposed to drugs
when their mothers refuse or fail to get the care and treatment they
need is to commit them involuntarily to a secure drug rehabilitation
center. Only Minnesota employs the use of prenatal commitment.
The involuntary commitment scheme in Minnesota may push the
constitutional limits of government intervention, but it is both an
effective and legitimate response to the problem of prenatal drug
exposure. Although pregnant women do have substantial privacy
rights, the right to use drugs must give way to the government's
interests in the quality of fetal life and the health and welfare of
children and childrens' rights to be born free from the harmful effects
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life' would be severely undermined if
it could require birth [at viability] but do nothing to ensure that the life it saved is
worth living.") (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)). The state's interest
in protecting fetal life would be no less undermined if the state could do nothing to
prevent the illegal and egregiously harmful conduct of maternal drug abuse throughout pregnancy.
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of prenatal drug exposure. Involuntary commitment of pregnant
addicts who refuse treatment, should be upheld as a measure which
is rationally related to the government interests. A woman's right to
liberty and bodily autonomy with respect to drug use may also be
superseded as long as she is afforded due process. Finally, although
Minnesota's involuntary commitment scheme has a disparate effect
on women, it survives an equal protection analysis. Pregnancy classifications do not necessarily indicate gender discrimination as long
as they are legitimately related to a valid biological distinction.
Maternal drug use obviously has a more critical effect on a fetus
during its development than paternal drug use.
In closing, the cocaine baby problem cries out for a response,
and the problem demands an extraordinary solution. Available medical care and drug treatment, education, and persuasion are important
and necessary components. However, civil involuntary commitment,
including forced medical care and drug treatment, are appropriate
and necessary when more persuasive techniques fail. Such a civil
solution avoids the stigma associated with criminal laws and accomplishes the same result as forced care and treatment pursuant to a
criminal conviction. Of course, lawmakers concerned with remedying
the plight of children who are exposed to drugs in their mothers'
wombs must be careful to avoid unjustified judgment of pregnant
addicts. The women are victims too. They also have rights, and
lawmakers must be careful not to craft laws that unnecessarily intrude
upon their rights. The aim must be to protect the quality of fetal life
to ensure the birth of children free from the harmful effects of
prenatal drug exposure. The laws should protect the interests and
welfare of both the women and the children they bear to the extent
they are inseparable. At the same time, children and society should
not have to bear the consequences of a woman's decidedly illegal
choice to use drugs during her pregnancy.
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